Some people say lying, promoting disinformation and publication of mystifying scenarios with all kinds of versions of the truth is a sign of guilt… especially when the Russians are concerned. But what did the Ukrainian regime or people close to them exactly do the first days after MH17 was downed?
Well, they did this:
1. Supporting deliberate misinterpretation and manipulation of the meaning of a retracted posting, published on a pro-rebel site dedicated in name to the commander-in-chief of the DNR forces Igor – “Strelkov” – Girkin. With this the story the separatists would have made a fatal mistake by downing the wrong plane was set on track.
The second building block of the fatal mistake narrative comprised the spliced-and-edited Bezler-Kozytsin tapes – issued a few hours after the pro Kiev network relays were filled with screenshots of the retracted Strelkov_info message. More, see item 2. below.
2. Publication of the fake “Bezler-Kozytsin confession tapes”, actually matching events from the 16th glued to 17.7 scenes from separatist reconnaissance troops finding debris from MH17, to further bolster the fatal mistake narrative (17 July);
Now JIT formally endorsed the Ukraine-at-war/Bellingcat launch spot, no one ever dares to talk again about those SBU tapes featuring a story cossacks from Chernukhino would have shot down MH17, which fell down outside Enakievo. Even after this blatant SBU forgery the JIT still shows a lot of trust in SBU tapes, which all show strange irregularities. This also casts doubts on the value of its investigation.
3. Brokering a story of “terrorist” (=separatist) guilt and false testimony by pushing fake witnesses from a select group of Torez/Snizhne based pro-Kiev infowarriors to regime friendly western news outlets via the advisor for the Ministry of the Interior, Anton Gerashchenko.
A. Alleged launch plume photographer Pavel A. issuing accusations in a Business Insider article (17 July);
Aaron Geller of Business Insider contacted Pavel presumably because the latter had posted a tweet in which was said: “In Torez a plane shot down! It fell near the quarter!“. Pavel deleted this tweet, as he did with his replies to Aaron Geller, but they were captured anyway. Of course the odds Geller had found Pavel are far less than the odds someone had made him aware of this witness.
Apparently Pavel was not in charge of disseminating information about the picture of the launch plume himself (this appeared to be WowihaY/Gerashchenko’s job), as he told Business Insider nothing about him taking the photo which would become the cornerstone of evidence of a Buk launch from rebel held territory.
More, see from p. 5-6 in report: The trail that wasn’t a launch plume – a reconstruction
B. Andrey T. issuing a statement about seeing the launch plume in an article by NBC News.
Not only were Pavel and Andrey two acquaintances of Buk sighting tweeter WowihaY, they also were two of the few witnesses of the launch plume known in public.
At the JIT pressconference, held on 28.9.2016, a new image of the alleged launch plume was shown. Though the JIT claimed to have found it themselves only “in spring 2016 after intensive research”, the picture appeared to have a connection with Andrey T.
So Andrey T. would not only have seen the plume when walking home from work, but after more than two years it became clear he probably also had captured it on tape with a camera running at an observation post while he was away.
More, see section II, “Problems of the sightings on social media” in Problems of the track-a-trail narrative – a review and “JIT comes up with crap launch site (and gets away with it)”
4. Publication of the fake Khmuryi/Motel intercepted telephone calls, spliced and edited to construct a narrative of a “big terrorist convoy” consisting of Vostok vehicles and the Buk (18 July).
The SBU intercepted a telephone call between second in command of the DNR forces Sergey Petrovsky aka “Khmuryi” and deputy commander of the Vostok battalion, San Sanych. Though the impression was layed out Khmuryi agrees with Sanych to take the Buk in a column of a Vostok convoy, driving for Donetsk to Marinovka on the 17th, the Buk did not go with Vostok as footage of that day testifies.
Moreover, as the SBU claims Sanych is Khmuryi’s deputy, he actuall was deputy of Aleksander Khodakovsky, commander of Vostok. Between him and the leaders of the DNR forces, Khmuryi and Igor Strelkov, existed a lot of animosity, which even had led to fightings in Donetsk city. Both DNR commanders did not trust Khodakovsky and his troops, as they claimed they were extortionists and black marketeers. This way it is almost incredible to suggest they would ever allow Vostok to get hold of a Buk unit.
The SBU claims Sanych would be Khmuryi’s deputy, which is disinformation. Actually Sanych was deputy of Khmuryi’s foe Khodakovsky, commander of battalion Vostok.
Nevertheless several sources, official and unofficial, peddled the story of a big terrorist convoy containing a Buk hauled by “truck mounted with a machine-gun” (KAMAZ), a unique Vostok vehicle not even on the road that day. This story would match the suggestion laid down in these tapes, which were released by the SBU on July 18th, but not real events.
5. Publication at midnight (by InfoResistance, Euromaydan and Anton Gerashchenko) of coordinates, locating the Buk on the exact same position as the Buk from the “Snizhne Buk video”, to support a story of a Buk flight to Russian, but by Marinovka via the T0522 (instead of Krasnodon, see below).
INFORESISTANCE (led by Dmitry Tymchuk) – 0:32 AM, 18 July
“According to operational data group “Information Resistance” Russian terrorists quickly evacuate the territory of the Russian Federation SAM “Buk”, which shot down a passenger airliner “Malaysia Airlines”. At the moment the terrorist machine column routed from the town of Snizhne in the direction of the state border on the highway Т0522. The column of the SAM “Buk” has passed the point 48.011623, 38.763036.”
ANTON GERASHCHENKO (advisor of the Ministry of the Interior) – 1:41 AM, 18 July
“This very moment Putin in a desperate attempt to hide the consequences of his deeds is trying to hide a rocket complex “Buk” on Russian territory. Ten minutes ago a row of military machinery including the above–mentioned “Buk” has passed the point 48.011623, 38.763036 on the road T-0522. It is only ten kilometers left to Russia.“
The disinformation disseminated just after midnight on the 18th contained a few important features. First, it said the Buk fled in a column, which could not be held up against all other alleged evidence of its flight (the Luhansk video, the “Get-away tapes” intercepted calls allegedly from the morning of the 18th, suggesting the Buk was delivered in Russia).
Of course, there was that column matching the Khmuryi tapes, the realtime Euromaydan facebook posting and the messages from politician Tymchuk and blogger Ukraine-at-war (see item 8). But this column never existed in realtime, as also the JIT assumes according to their September 2016 pressconference. (The Buk would have been escorted by a few cars).
Second, it showed coordinates exactly matching the position the Buk had on the Snizhne T0522 Buk video, a video showing the Buk allegedly at about 1 PM, 17 July, on route towards the farmland from where it would have shot down the plane. This video was published just before 20:30 local time, deleted within 2 hrs, but re-uploaded by Eliot Higgins, WowihaY’s Torez.info and Euromaydan.
So at about midnight knowledgde of its existence must have been fresh, as it (allegedly) had existed in public for only 4 hrs. But A. there was no column visible on this video, and B. it was not taken at midnight. So how could this account for a fleeing Buk? Or was it pure coincidence the position mentioned in these midnight messages was the same as the midday Buk video? In that case, then where were these mysterious parts of “operational information” founded on?
Third, Anton Gerashchenko claimed he had received intelligence “10 minutes ago”, suggesting up-to-date information. Actually he posted more than an hour after the InfoResistance message, which already said the Buk column had passed the point.
Furthermore, he made it look as if there was some progress on the route. Though he mentions the same coordinates of the Snizhne Buk video, he also claims “its only 10 kilometers left to Russia”. This way the Buk column had proceeded some 10 kilometers in more than an hour between the first message with the coordinates and Gerashchenko’s info. Or was it only his conjecturing and hadn’t he received intel?
So obviously there was a need to move the Buk over the border in no-time. The info with which it was done contradicted the story the Ukrainians put out later on, see points 6 and 7 below.
Notwithstanding this conclusion, both InfoResistance and Gerashchenko pretended as if they received first hand intelligence. In reality it seems the parts were from existing (dis)information available, somehow put together to disseminate a story a Buk was fleeing to the Russian border by the T0522 and Marinovka.
6. Publication of the disinformation regarding the narrative of the fleeing Buk at Krasnodon near the Russian border “missing one missile” (18, 19 July), to sustain a story the Buk was brought back into Russia immediately after the shot down (see also 7.). The site where the video was taken appeared to be Luhansk and the date of the video is very uncertain, to say the least, and cannot be dated on the 18th at this moment.
– JIT animation. Buk “missing one missile” driving on the low-loader again to be brought to the Russian border. This way it could account for the Luhansk video. Initially the Luhansk video was said to depict a drive-by in Krasnodon, which is much closer to the Russian border.
Andrey Lysenko, National Security Advisor, held a presser on 17 July from 17:00 local time, 40 minutes after the plane crashed. At the presser he stated the Ukrainians were aware the rebels had possession of a Buk complex. Apparently he did not know about the crash at this moment yet, but conveyed an important lead of an already existing video of a Buk transport near Luhansk. See discussion here
When the video of a fleeing buk “missing one missile” near Luhansk was published, it was said it was taken in the early morning of the 18th. However, the other video, the one Lysenko was talking about, was not made public. Of course, this raised the question if the Luhansk Buk video had already been in the possession of the Ukrainians and could not account for the fleeing Buk.
More, see section I, the Luhansk video in: Problems of the track-a-trail narrative -a review
7. The disinformation issued at a 19.7 presser by counter-intel chief Nayda showing their own Buk 312 to be a Russian Buk responsible for downing MH17 (19 July).
Interestingly, also this Ukrainian Buk was hauled by a civilian truck with a white cabin. See here for a video in which the Nayda transport features.
8. Publication of a still from a video of a Buk transport in Zuhres and 2 stills of Vostok vehicles to suggest the Buk was moved within a large “terrorist” convoy (17 July Euromaydan (in realtime!), blogger U@w and politician Dmitry Tymchuk, 19 July SBU/Nayda ); In reality the actual convoy, Vostok, never drove with a Buk as can be seen on various videos of the 17th. Also, some of the Vostok vehicles mentioned in the sightings were not even on the road that day.
9. Publication of the fake (misdated and mistimed) “Birdie comes to you taps“, to support the fatal mistake narrative, leaving a Buk crew only an incredible 60 seconds to go through command structure and launch sequence based on ambiguous information from an very incompetent spotter who couldn’t even discern a freighter plane flying at 5 km height with a speed of 450 km/h from a civil aircraft flying at 10 km height with a speed of over 900 km/h (25 July);
After their 28.9.2016 presser the JIT published some animations. In one of them, showing “the weapon”, it was said:
“It takes a few minutes to prepare the TELAR for launch a missile. A number of deliberate actions have to be performed, including unlocking the missile” . – JIT Animation “The Weapon”, 1:22.
Of course, this puts even more pressure on the story of the incredible fast launch.
10. Publication of the Paris Match stills with wrong location and time (25 July). Why was conveyed wrong information to Paris Match? Didn’t the “freelance photographer” realize he actually was in Donetsk on the 17th?
11. Peddling of a story the Buk transport was led by a demand for secrecy directive to give an explanation for the almost total absence of Buk sightings and footage, though it allegedly went through densely populated area in broad daylight. By the way, a few weeks before not one Russian/pro-separatist outlet had shown any anxiety in publishing news about an alleged seized Buk from a raided Ukrainian airforce base.
12. In the first days the Ukrainian/western story about separatist/Russian guilt was mainly built on the assumption rebels were in possession of a Buk, because they seized it from Ukrainian airforce base A-1402 after it was raided. A posting on a DNR twitter account of a photo of a Buk, actually made in 2011 as later came out, should bolster this narrative.
Also photo of conscripts of the Ukrainian army posing went viral to account for separatist guilt. Problem of this story was the Russians could not be accused directly, as rebels had had their own way of acquiring a Buk.
Photo of ATO conscript Sergey Paschenko in front of CP100, TELAR 121 and probably TELAR 122 of the 1st battalion of the 156th regiment. This photo was aired as proof for separatist possession of Buk units.
Because separatists nor Russian could be deemed to profit from the downing of MH17, discussing motive also was a problem. On August the 7th, 2014, the SBU said to have found one. Motive had been a false flag operation that had gone wrong, resulting in shooting down the wrong plane. The blame shifted to the Russians.
Though former head of the SBU Naivalychenko still holds on to this story and it also still is around on the SBU website, after November 2014 a third story surfaced. It was also a story that could blame Russia directly, but in a far more credible way than the SBU tale of a Russian conspiracy.
Bellingcat took the forefront. On November the 9th they published a report “Origin of the separatist Buk”, purportedly showing the Buk was delivered by the Russian Kursk convoy, that had toured around near the Ukrainian border in the end of June. From this moment on the story of the Buk seized on an airforce base slided into oblivion as did the pretty unbelievable SBU concoction.
Remarkably, whenever the pro-Ukrainian side proposes a story of events, it is always accompanied with the assurance its the truth and nothing but the truth. When sources with another point of view issue their visions, they will be labeled as conspiracists, following a strategy of casting doubts to create a world in which truth no longer exists. Usefullness is obvious. If you identify yourself with Truth, everyone with a different opinion can be cast aside as a liar.
This way the basic premisse – the separatists and their Russian guardians drove a Buk around the Donbass to shoot down MH17 – was sanctified from the first hours after the crash, no matter what story was devised to back it up. It was embraced as a Dogma, as persistent as Divine Truth itself. Therefore all kinds of stories, “evidence”, insinuations and accusations were pushed to keep other conceivable scenarios out of the way.
Finally, we are able to conclude the Ukrainian side and their helpers did a lot to disseminate disinformation to keep their dogma going. So what is your opinion about the relation between issuing disinformation and guilt now?
Updated with more information at 26.11.2016